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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

The Chilean Congressional Election of 2 March 1969

FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
Chief, WHD				DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Deputy Director for Plans		4 Mar 69		
2. [REDACTED]				
3.				
4. Director of Central Intelligence				
5. [REDACTED]				
6.				
7. C/WHD				TO 7. Thank you
8. DC/WH		10 MAR 1969		
9. C/WH [REDACTED]				
10. C/WH [REDACTED]				
11. C/Chile				
12. [REDACTED]				#4 APPEARS PLEASED.
13.				
14. Declassified and Approved for Release July 2000				File: [REDACTED] WITH PINK SHEET

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4 MAR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT : The Chilean Congressional Election of
2 March 1969

1. According to initial reports, our congressional election operation in Chile has been successfully executed. The operation had been designed to (a) support individual, moderate candidates of the three non-Marxist political parties, (b) fund a dissident Socialist party, and (c) carry out propaganda activities against the Marxist left.

2. Ten of the twelve candidates selected for support by the field election team composed of Embassy and Station personnel were elected:


The most significant victory was that of

The Dissident Socialist party (DSP) elected no candidates of its own, but did poll more than 50,000 votes and thus deprived the regular, Communist Socialist Party (PS) of about seven congressional seats. Difficult as it is to judge the effect of propaganda activities on any election, it can be said that in this instance the exploitation of the Communist Party support of the Czechoslovakian invasion cost that party votes in Santiago.

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3. Since the congressional election is an important benchmark for the September 1970 presidential contest, we note the following in this regard: (a) the Christian Democrats' drop to about 30 percent of the vote, losing ground to both the right and the extreme left, is a defeat for President Frei and his party; (b) the National Party's acquisition of about 20 percent of the vote represents a re-emergence of the Chilean right and another boost to the presidential candidacy of former president Jorge Alessandri; (c) the Communists did well by polling about 16 percent of the vote and, with their Socialists allies, still represent about 30 percent of the electorate; and (d) the Radical Party's decline to about 12.5 percent of the vote is a setback for this perennially pivotal party and its goal to head a popular front alliance for 1970.

4. A report to the 303 Committee on our role in the election will be made as soon as we have the final field evaluation.


William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

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